ABSTRACT The privacy of users must be considered as the utmost priority in distributed networks. To protect the identities of users, attribute-based encryption (ABE) was presented by Sahai et al. ABE has been widely used in many scenarios, particularly in cloud computing. In this paper, public key encryption with equality test is concatenated with key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) to present KP-ABE with equality test (KP-ABEwET). The proposed scheme not only offers fine-grained authorization of ciphertexts but also protects the identities of users. In contrast to ABE with keyword search, KP-ABEwET can test whether the ciphertexts encrypted by different public keys contain the same information. Moreover, the authorization process of the presented scheme is more flexible than that of Ma et al.'s scheme. Furthermore, the proposed scheme achieves one-way against chosen-ciphertext attack based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption. In addition, a new computational problem called the twin-decision BDH problem (tDBDH) is proposed in this paper. tDBDH is proved to be as hard as the decisional BDH problem. Finally, for the first time, the security model of authorization is provided, and the security of authorization based on the tDBDH assumption is proven in the random oracle model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the current network era, cloud service providers offer infinite storage space and computing power for users to manage their data. To enjoy these services, individuals and organizations store their private data on cloud servers. However, in the case of security breaches, users' private data stored in the cloud are no longer safe. When users outsource their data to cloud servers, they expect complete privacy of their data stored in the cloud. Protecting the privacy and data of users has remained a very crucial problem for cloud servers. To avoid any inconvenience, users store their private data in encrypted form.
For fine-grained sharing of encrypted data, Sahai and Waters presented attribute-based encryption (ABE) [2] . ABE is a public key cryptosystem variant that allows users to access secret data based on their attributes. This cryptosystem enriches the flexibility of the encryption policy and the description of users' rights, and it changes from a one-one to one-many scenario during the encryption and decryption phases. Moreover, it hides the identities of the users in appropriate terms. In a subsequent work, Goyal et al. proposed key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) in 2006 [18] . The underlying cryptosystem combines the secret key and the access structure. Bethencourt et al. proposed ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) in 2007 [19] , which combines the ciphertext and the access structure. Thereafter, numerous cryptographers presented many research works based on ABE [20] - [24] . Soon after its conceptualization, ABE reached prime importance in our daily life (for example, in television payment systems, personal health record systems and so on). Moreover, ABE is also being widely incorporated in cloud computing. However, if one wants to compare plaintexts corresponding to two ciphertexts, the secret key must be used to decrypt the two ciphertexts.
To overcome this problem, Yang et al. [25] presented a new cryptosystem called public key encryption with equality test (PKEwET) in 2010. His proposed system can test whether two ciphertexts contain the same plaintexts without decryption. However, this scheme allows anyone to perform such a test. To overcome this defect, Tang [26] made some improvements to the scheme (e.g., PKEET with finegrained authorization (FGwPKEET), all-or-nothing PKEET (AoNwPKEET) [28] and an extension of FG-PKEwET [27] ). In 2015, Ma et al. [29] proposed a new primitive called PKEwET supporting flexible authorization (PKEwET-FA). There are 4 types of flexible authorizations in their scheme. To simplify the certificate management of PKEwET, Ma [30] combined the concepts of PKEwET and identity-based encryption to present identity-based encryption with equality test (IBEET). Recently, in 2017, Wu et al. [31] improved Ma et al.'s scheme by reducing the computational time cost. To offer more fine-grained authorization, we propose a new primitive called key-policy attribute-based encryption with equality test (KP-ABEwET). We combine the concepts of PKEwET and KP-ABE. As presented in Fig. 1 , suppose that there are four users. S and S are the sets of attributes for encryption, and T and T refer to the access structures used by the decryption secret key. S denotes the set of attributes of the tester, and T A is the access structure used for the authorization of the attribute set of S A . T B is the access structure used for the authorization of the attribute set of S B . We describe the underlying scenario as follows: User 1 can store his private data in the cloud and can decrypt the ciphertexts that are encrypted by a set of attributes S with T(S) = 1. User 2 can store his private data in the cloud, but he cannot decrypt the ciphertexts that are encrypted by a set of attributes S with T(S) = 1. User 3 has the attribute S , where T A (S ) = 1 and T B (S ) = 1, and he can perform the test over two different ciphertexts encrypted by attribute S A and attribute S B . User 4 does not have the attribute S satisfying T A (S ) = 1 and T B (S ) = 1, and he cannot perform the test over two different ciphertexts encrypted by attribute S A and attribute S B .
A. CONTRIBUTION
This paper presents a new primitive called key-policy attribute-based encryption with equality test (KP-ABEwET). Our objective is to achieve a fine-grained authorization of ciphertexts. The main technologies in our scheme include key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [18] and public key encryption with equality test (PKEwET) [25] . The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) First, we design a new scheme by combining KP-ABE with PKEwET. Compared with the existing PKEwET schemes, our proposed scheme supports performing the finegrained test of ciphertexts and changes from one-one to one-many for users in the testing algorithm.
(2) Our scheme can be viewed as an extension of attributebased encryption with keyword search (ABEwKS). Along with other aspects, the proposed scheme allows testing whether the ciphertexts contain the same information that are encrypted by different public keys.
(3) The proposed scheme achieves one-way against chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the random oracle model.
(4) A new computational problem called the twin-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (tDBDH) is also presented and is proven to be as hard as the DBDH problem.
(5) We provide the security model of authorization and prove the security of authorization based on the tDBDH assumption in the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to prove the security of authorization in such a manner.
B. RELATED WORK
Deterministic encryption, proposed by Bellare et al. [8] , is another primitive that supports the equality test on ciphertexts. This primitive was thoroughly studied in many subsequent works [1] , [7] , [32] , but all of them are deterministic algorithms. Conversely, PKEwET is a probabilistic algorithm that supports the equality test on ciphertexts.
PKEwET can be viewed as an extension of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). The concept of PEKS was proposed by Boneh et al. [4] . It can perform keyword searches over ciphertexts without decrypting them. Later, several modified schemes of PEKS were proposed [6] , [9] , [11] , [12] . To solve the problem of access control in a multi-user environment, PEKS was combined with ABE for achieving the applied perspective in cloud computing. In [5] , [10] , [13] , [15] , [17] , and [33] , the authors combined PKES with KP-ABE. In some other works, including [3] , [14] , [16] , the authors combined PKES with CP-ABE while incorporating the access structure with the ciphertext of the keyword search. Although the results were slightly different, none of the works presented a mechanism to check whether two different ciphertexts encrypted by different public keys contain the same information. To overcome this limitation, we present an effective KP-ABEwET mechanism.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related preliminaries. Section 3 describes the system and the security model. Our scheme is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides the security proof VOLUME 5, 2017 of our scheme and of authorization. In Section 6, the performance evaluations are briefly discussed. Finally, Section 7 presents the concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this part, we introduce some basic knowledge, including cryptographic assumptions, Shamir's secret sharing scheme and access tree, that is employed in this paper.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS
The following subsection presents the definitions of bilinear maps and the problem formulation.
Definition 1: Bilinear Maps: Let G 1 and G 2 be multiplicative groups of prime order q, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G 1 . Bilinear maps fulfill the following conditions:
(1) Bilinearity:
Definition 2: Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem: Let G 1 and G 2 be multiplicative groups of prime order q, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G 1 . The BDH problem is that given a 4-tuple (g, g a , g b , g c ), the aim is to compute e(g, g) abc , where a, b, c ∈ Z q . Definition 3: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem: Let G 1 and G 2 be multiplicative groups of prime order q, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G 1 . The DBDH problem is to distinguish between the distributions of 5-
Definition 4: Twin-Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (tDBDH) problem: Let G 1 and G 2 be multiplicative groups of prime order q, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G 1 . The tDBDH problem is to distinguish between the following two distributions:
In general, the tDBDH problem appears to be weaker than the DBDH problem. However, this problem is in fact as hard as the DBDH problem. (The tDBDH problem is different from the twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problem that proposed by Chen et al.) 2 = e(g, g) abcx 2 . Apparently, it is doubly confirming that the input is a yes DBDH instance. Thus, B replies "yes". If A outputs no, then it implies that either e(g, g) d = e(g, g) abc or e(g, g) dx 2 = e(g, g) abcx 2 . Regardless of which is true, B can quickly deduce that the input is a no DBDH instance. Thus, B replies "no".
B. SHAMIR'S SECRET SHARING SCHEME Shamir's (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is based on the Lagrange interpolation polynomial. A detailed introduction is described as follows:
Given t distinct points (
, where f (x) is a polynomial of degree less than t, f (x) is determined as follows:
Shamir's scheme is defined for a secret s ∈ Z p by setting a 0 = s and choosing
Since the secret is a constant term s = a 0 = f (0), the secret can be recovered from any t shares (x i , f (x i )) as follows: 
C. ACCESS TREE
We suppose that T is an access tree composed of leaf nodes and non-leaf nodes (e.g., Fig. 2 ). Each leaf node represents an attribute, and each non-leaf node represents a threshold gate. Each threshold gate is represented by its children and the threshold value. Let num x be the number of children of a 20430 VOLUME 5, 2017 node x and k x be the threshold value of the node x; we have 0 ≤ k x ≤ num x . Then, each leaf node has a threshold value k x = 1.
We suppose that the children of every node do have orders from 1 to num. Next, we define some new functions. The function parent(x) represents the parent of node x. The function att(x) is defined as an attribute associated with the leaf node. The function index(x) returns the number associated with node x.
Let r be the root of an access tree T, expressed as T r . T x refers to the subtree of T rooted at node x. T x (S) = 1 means that the set of attributes S satisfies the tree T x . Here, we use a recursive algorithm to compute T x (S).
• If x is a non-leaf node, we compute T x (S) for all children x of x. If at least k x children return 1, then T x (S) returns 1.
• If x is a leaf node, then T x (S) returns 1 if att(x) ∈ S.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the system and the security model. A. SYSTEM MODEL Fig. 3 illustrates the system model of KP-ABEwET. The system has three participating entities: the cloud server, the users and a trusted third party. The trusted third party generates public key pk and private key sk for users. The users encrypt and send their private data to the cloud server. If a user wants the cloud server to test the ciphertext, then the cloud server is authorized and gains a trapdoor tr. However, the cloud server can only test whether the two ciphertexts contain the same information and cannot decrypt them using the trapdoor. The legitimate users access data according to their attributes and can decrypt their ciphertexts or test the ciphertexts. If the legitimate users satisfy the access structure for the test, they can get the test results of the ciphertexts from the cloud server. If the legitimate users satisfy the access structure for the decryption, they can decrypt the ciphertexts.
An integrated KP-ABEwET scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Trapdoor, Decrypt and Test. Here, we let M be plaintext space and C be ciphertext space.
(1) Setup(k): It takes a security parameter k as input, and then it outputs the public parameters pp and pk and the master key mk.
(2) Encrypt(M , pk, S, S ): It takes a message M ∈ M, public key pk and two sets of attributes S, S as inputs, and then it outputs the ciphertext CT ∈ C.
(3) KeyGen(T, T , S, S , pp, mk): This algorithm takes as inputs the master key mk, two access trees T, T , and two sets of attributes S, S that satisfy T(S) = 1 and T (S ) = 1, and it subsequently outputs the private key sk.
(4) Trapdoor(S , T , mk): It takes mk, T and S as inputs, and it outputs the trapdoor td.
(5) Decrypt(CT , sk, S, S ): It takes as inputs a ciphertext CT ∈ C, S, S and the private key sk, and it outputs the message M if T(S) = 1 and T (S ) = 1. Here, CT is encrypted using the sets S and S . 
B. SECURITY MODEL
Here, the security model of the proposed scheme and the security model of authorization are presented.
First, we define one-way against chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) for KP-ABEwET under a chosen set of attributes, as follows.
Game 1: Suppose that A is the adversary. A announces a set of attributes that he wishes to be challenged, shown as S.
(1) Setup. The challenger C takes a security parameter k as input and outputs public parameters pp to A with the Setup algorithm of KP-ABEwET.
(2) Phase 1. A performs the following types of queries polynomially many times.
• Key retrieve queries: A performs any queries for private keys for many access structures T i , where S / ∈ T i for all i. C sends sk to A.
• Decryption queries: A performs many queries for ciphertexts. C runs the Decrypt algorithm and outputs the plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext or ⊥ to A.
• Trapdoor queries: C runs the Trapdoor algorithm and outputs td to A. Game 2: Suppose that A 2 is an adversary. A 2 announces two sets of attributes S and S that he wishes to be challenged. Here, (S ∩ S ) = ∅, S is used for decryption, and S is used for the trapdoor.
(1) Setup. The challenger, C, takes a security parameter k as input and outputs public parameters pp to A 2 by using the Setup algorithm of KP-ABEwET.
(2) Phase 1. A 2 performs the following types of queries polynomially many times.
• Key retrieve queries: A 2 performs many queries for private keys for any access structures T i and T j , where S / ∈ T i for all i and S / ∈ T j for all j. C sends sk to A 2 .
• Decryption queries: A 2 performs many queries for ciphertexts. C runs the Decrypt algorithm and outputs the plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext or ⊥ to A 2 .
• Trapdoor queries: C runs the Trapdoor algorithm and outputs td to A 2 .
• Test queries: C runs the Test algorithm and outputs 1 for equality ciphertexts and 0 for unequal ciphertexts or ⊥. (3) Challenge: C chooses a random number ϑ ∈ {0, 1}. If ϑ = 1, then C chooses one message M , sets 
The advantage of A 2 is defined as |Pr[ϑ * = ϑ] − 1/2|. Definition 6: The KP-ABEwET scheme is T-CCA secure in terms of authorization if the advantage of all polynomial time adversaries is negligible in the aforementioned game.
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTIONS
The following section presents the proposed KP-ABEwET scheme.
Setup (k): It takes a security parameter k as input and outputs public parameters pp as follows:
(1) Generate bilinear groups, G 1 , G 2 and |G 1 | = q, |G 2 | = q, and choose a random generator g ∈ G 1 . Then, let e :
(2) Let A be a universe of properties of attributes. For simplicity, we take the first A elements of Z * q as the universe, formally as 1, 2, · · · , |A|(mod q). (4) Choose x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x |A| , y 1 , y 2 ∈ Z * q randomly, and then output public keys pk,
, and the master key mk,
It takes a message M , public key pk and two sets of attributes S, S as inputs, where (S ∩ S ) = ∅, S is used for decryption, and S is used for testing. Then, it outputs the ciphertext as follows:
Choose r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z q randomly, and then formulate the following:
KeyGen (T, T , S, S , pp, mk):
This algorithm takes the master key mk, two sets of attributes S, S satisfying T(S) = 1 and T (S ) = 1 and (S S) = ∅ as inputs, and it outputs the private key as follows:
(1) The algorithm chooses a polynomial q x for each node x in the tree T. The polynomials are chosen from top to bottom, starting from the root node r. The details are presented as follows:
• For each node x in T, it sets the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be one less than the threshold value k x of that node, which means that d x = k x − 1.
• Then, for the root node r, it sets q r (0) = y 1 and randomly chooses d r other points of the polynomial q r to define it completely.
• For any other node x, it sets q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)) and randomly chooses d x other points to completely define q x .
• For each leaf node x, it outputs D x = g q x (0)/x i , where
The algorithm chooses a polynomial q t for each node t in T . The polynomials are chosen from top to bottom, starting from the root node r . The details are described as follows:
• For each node t in T , it sets the degree d t of the polynomial q t to be one less than the threshold value k t of that node, which means that d t = k t − 1.
• Then, for the root node r , it sets q r (0) = y 2 and randomly chooses d r other points of the polynomial q r to define it completely.
• For any other node t, the algorithm sets q t (0) = q parent(t) (index(t)) and randomly chooses d t other points to completely define q t .
• For each leaf node t, it outputs T t = g q t (0)/x j , where j = att(t). 
Trapdoor (T , S , mk): It takes T , S and mk as inputs; subsequently, it outputs a trapdoor td to test the ciphertexts as follows. Here, T (S ) = 1.
The algorithm chooses a polynomial q t for each node t in T . The polynomials are chosen from top to bottom, starting from the root node r . The details are as follows:
• For each leaf node t, it outputs T t = g q t (0)/x j , where j = att(t). The algorithm outputs trapdoor td = g q t (0)/x j , where j = att(t).
Decrypt (CT , sk, S, S ): For decryption, we define a recursive algorithm, which is described as follows:
It takes the ciphertext CT , the private key sk and a node x in the tree T as inputs and outputs a group element of G 2 or ⊥.
If x is a leaf node and i ∈ S, where i = att(x), then the algorithm computes as follows:
Otherwise, we define DecryptNode(CT , sk, x) =⊥. Now, we consider that x is a non-leaf node. DecryptNode (CT , sk, x) executes as follows:
Suppose that z is the child of x. Then, it executes algorithm DecryptNode(CT , sk, z) and stores the output as O z . Let F x be an arbitrary k x -sized set of child nodes z such that O z =⊥. If no such set exists, then the node is not satisfied and the function returns ⊥.
Otherwise, we compute the following:
, Otherwise, it computes the following: B,2 ) using the same method as above. , r A,1 , r A,3 (resp. r B,1 , r B,3 ) are the randomness used in the generation of CT A (resp. CT B ).
• Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. SECURITY OF SCHEME
The following subsection provides the security proof of the presented KP-ABEwET scheme.
Theorem 2: Our proposed scheme is OW-CCA secure against the adversary who is authorized with a trapdoor based on the BDH assumption in the random oracle model. VOLUME 5, 2017 Proof: Suppose that A is the adversary that can break the presented KP-ABEwET scheme. Then, there is an algorithm C to solve the BDH problem with a non-negligible advantage. Given a 4-tuple (g, A, B, C) = (g, g a , g b , g c ) , the objective of algorithm C is to compute e(g, g) abc .
Init Suppose that there is a universe U. A chooses a set of attributes S as his target.
Setup Let Y 1 = e(A, B) = e(g, g) ab , Y 2 = e(g, g) y (y ∈ Z p ). For i ∈ U, C sets X i as follows: if i ∈ S, it chooses a random α i ∈ Z p and sets X i = g α i (x i = α i ); otherwise, it chooses a random τ i ∈ Z p and sets X i = g bτ i = B τ i . Then, C gives the public parameters pp
Here, H 1 is a random oracle controlled by C, as described below.
Phase 1 A performs the following types of queries polynomially times.
• H 1 -query: A may issue queries to the random oracle H 1 . To respond to these queries, C maintains a list of tuples H 1 . Each element in the list is a tuple of the form (S λ , δ λ , η λ ). The list is initially empty. Responding to query (S λ , δ λ ), C runs as follows:
-If the query (S λ , δ λ ) already appears in the H 1 list in the form (S λ , δ λ , η λ ), then C responds to A with H 1 (S λ , δ λ ) = η λ . -Otherwise, C just takes η λ ∈ G 2 , and then it responds to A with H 1 (S λ , δ λ ) = η λ . C adds the tuple (S λ , δ λ , η λ ) to the H 1 list.
• Key retrieve queries: A performs many queries for private keys for many access structures T, where S does not satisfy T. C sends sk to A as follows:
(1) C builds two algorithms: SatT and DNSatT, as follows:
This algorithm constructs the polynomials for the nodes of an access sub-tree with a satisfied root node when T x (S) = 1. It takes as inputs a set of attributes S, an access tree T x and a random number v x ∈ Z p , and it outputs a polynomial q x of degree d x for the root node x as follows: Let q x (0) = v x and randomly choose d x other points of the polynomial q x to construct q x . The algorithm constructs polynomials for each child node x of x by executing the algorithm SatT(T x , S, q x (index(x ))).
DNSatT(T x , S, g v x )
: This algorithm constructs the polynomials for the nodes when T x (S) = 0. It takes a set of attributes S, an access tree T x and a random element g v x ∈ G 1 , where v x ∈ Z p , and it outputs a polynomial q x of degree d x for the root node x as follows: Because T x (S) = 0, the root node has less than d x satisfied children. Suppose that s x is the number of satisfied children of x, which implies that s x < d x .
The algorithm chooses a random number v x ∈ Z p for each satisfied child x of x. Let q x (index(x )) = v x and randomly choose other d x − s x points of the polynomial q x to construct q x . We obtain q x (·) for each node in T as follows.
If the node x is a satisfied node, then it executes the algorithm SatT(T x , S, q x (index(x ))). Here, we know q x (index(x )). Otherwise, it runs the algorithm DNSatT(T x , S, g q x (index(x )) ). Here, we know g q x (index(x )) .
In the above algorithms, we know q x for each leaf node x clearly satisfying T x ; otherwise, we know g q x (0) . Furthermore, q r (0) = a.
(2) C constructs a polynomial Q x (·) = bq x (·) and sets
• Decryption queries: Suppose that the ciphertext
-If i / ∈ S, then C generates a private key as above and calls the Decrypt algorithm with the valid sk and provides the output to A.
-Otherwise, C proceeds as follows: * If S λ is already included in the H 1 list in the form of (S λ , δ λ , η λ ), then C executes as follows:
If yes, C outputs M to A. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥ to A. * Otherwise, it outputs ⊥ to A.
• Trapdoor queries: A performs many queries for trapdoor for many access structures T . C sends tr to A as follows: C constructs a polynomial Q t (·) as in key retrieve queries. Let j = att(t); then, output td = T t = g Q t (0)/x j = g bq t (0)/bτ j = g q t (0)/τ j to A. Challenge: C randomly chooses a message M * as a challenge message and outputs the ciphertext as follows:
C chooses random numbers r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q , S and W ∈ {0, 1} k+l . Then, it outputs
C responds to A with the challenge ciphertext CT * . Phase 2: A performs more queries as in phase 1. However, the restriction is that CT * does not appear in the decryption queries.
Guess: A submits a guess M . If M = M * , then it means that A can recover e(g, g) abc from (g a , g b , g c ) .
B. SECURITY OF AUTHORIZATION
Finally, we provide the security proof of authorization.
Theorem 3: Our proposed scheme is T-CCA secure in terms of authorization against the adversary A 2 based on the tDBDH assumption in the random oracle model. Proof: Suppose that A 2 is the adversary that can break our cryptosystem. Then, there is an algorithm C to solve the 20434 VOLUME 5, 2017 tDBDH problem as follows. The objective of algorithm C is to distinguish between the 7-tuples (A, B, C, E, F, D, G) =  (g a , g b , g c , g u , g v , e(g, g) abc , e(g, g) ubv ) and (A , B , C , E ,  F , D , G ) = (g a , g b , g c , g u , g v , e(g, g) d , e(g, g) w ), where
Init Suppose that there is a universe U. A 2 chooses two sets of attributes S and S as his target, where (S ∩ S) = ∅. Here, S is used for decryption, and S is used for the trapdoor. , g) ub . For i, j ∈ U, C sets X i as follows:
• If i ∈ S, it chooses a random α i ∈ Z p and sets
• Otherwise, it sets as follows: -If j ∈ S , it chooses a random β j ∈ Z p and sets X j = g β j (x j = β j ); -Otherwise, it chooses a random τ i ∈ Z p and sets
Here, H 1 and H 2 are random oracles controlled by C, as described below.
Phase 1 A 2 performs the following types of queries polynomially times.
• H 1 -query: A may issue queries to the random oracle H 1 . To respond to these queries, C maintains a list of tuples H 1 . Each element in the list is a tuple of the form (S λ , δ λ , η λ ). The list is initially empty. Responding to query (S λ , δ λ ), C runs as follows: -If the query (S λ , δ λ ) already appears in the H 1 list in the form (S λ , δ λ , η λ ), then C responds to A with H 1 (S λ , δ λ ) = η λ . -Otherwise, C just takes η λ ∈ G 2 , and C responds to A with H 1 (S λ , δ λ ) = η λ and adds the tuple (S λ , δ λ , η λ ) to the H 1 list.
• H 2 -query: A may issue queries to the random oracle H 2 . To respond to these queries, C maintains a list of tuples H 2 . Each element in the list is a tuple of the form (S λ , θ λ , µ λ ). The list is initially empty. Responding to query (S λ , θ λ ), C runs as follows: -If the query (S λ , θ λ ) already appears in the H 2 list in the form (S λ , θ λ , µ λ ), C responds to A 2 with H 2 (S λ , θ λ ) = µ λ . -Otherwise, C just takes µ λ ∈ G 1 , and C responds to A 2 with H 2 (S λ , θ λ ) = µ λ and adds the tuple (S λ , θ λ , µ λ ) to the H 2 list.
• Key retrieve queries: A 2 performs many queries for private keys for many access structures T and T , where S and S do not satisfy T and T , respectively. C sends sk to A 2 as follows:
(1) To generate secret key (D x , T t ), C builds two algorithms: SatT and DNSatT. SatT(T x , S, v x ): This algorithm constructs the polynomials for the nodes when T x (S) = 1. It takes a set of attributes S, an access tree T x and a random number v x ∈ Z p , and it outputs a polynomial q x of degree d x for the root node x as follows:
Let q x (0) = v x , and randomly choose d x other points of the polynomial q x to construct q x . It constructs polynomials for each child node x of x by running the algorithm SatT(T x , S, q x (index(x ))). DNSatT(T x , S, g v x ): This algorithm constructs the polynomials for the nodes when T x (S) = 0. It takes a set of attributes W, an access tree T x and a random element g v x ∈ G 1 , where v x ∈ Z p , and it outputs a polynomial q x of degree d x for the root node x as follows:
Because T x (S) = 0, the root node has less than d x satisfied children. Suppose that s x is the number of satisfied children of x, which implies that s x < d x .
The algorithm chooses a random number v x ∈ Z p for each satisfied child x of x. Let q x (index(x )) = v x and randomly choose other d x − s x points of the polynomial q x to construct q x . If the node x is a satisfied node, then it runs the algorithm SatT(T x , S, q x (index(x ))).
If the node x is not a satisfied node, then it executes the algorithm DNSatT(T x , S, g q x (index(x )) ).
In the above algorithms, we know q x for each leaf node x clearly satisfying T x ; otherwise, we know g q x (0) . Furthermore, q r (0) = a. C constructs a polynomial Q x (·) = bq x (·) and sets y 1 = Q r (0) = bq r (0) = ab. For T , it obtains q t (·) for each node in T as follows.
If the node t is a satisfied node, then it runs the algorithm SatT (T t , S , q t (index(t ))). Here, we know q t (index(t )). Otherwise, it executes the algorithm DNSatT (T x , S , g q t (index(t )) ). Here, we know g q t (index(t )) .
In the above algorithms, we know q t for each leaf node t clearly satisfying T t ; otherwise, we know g q t (0) . Furthermore, q r (0) = u. C constructs a polynomial Q t (·) = bq t (·) and sets y 2 = Q r (0) = uq r (0) = ub. Let i = att(x) and j = att(t).
-If i / ∈ S, C generates a private key of D x as above and calls the Decrypt algorithm with D x and saves M and r 1 , then it continues as follows:
-If i ∈ S, C proceeds as follows: * If S λ belongs to the H 1 list in the form of (S λ , δ λ , η λ ), then C executes as follows:
If yes, C outputs M to A 2 . Otherwise, C outputs ⊥ to A 2 . * Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. • Trapdoor queries: A 2 performs many queries for the trapdoor for many access structures T , where S does not satisfy T . C sends td to A 2 as follows: C uses the above algorithms: SatT and DNSatT. Then, it obtains q t (·) for each node in the T as follows.
If the node t is a satisfied node, then it runs the algorithm SatT (T t , S , q t (index(t ))). Here, we already know q t (index(t )). Otherwise, it runs the algorithm DNSatT (T x , S , g q t (index(t )) ). Here, we already know g q t (index(t )) .
In the above algorithms, we know q t for each leaf node t clearly satisfying T t ; otherwise, we know g q t (0) . Furthermore, q r (0) = u. C constructs a polynomial Q t (·) = bq t (·) and sets
• Test queries: Suppose that the ciphertext
-If j λ / ∈ S and j λ / ∈ S , then C generates td λ and td λ as above and calls the Test algorithm with the valid td λ and td λ , and it provides the output to A 2 .
-If j λ / ∈ S and j λ ∈ S , then C runs as follows: * For ciphertext CT λ , C generates a td λ as above, runs the Test algorithm and can obtain M r λ,1 λ with the valid td λ . Then, it checks whether C λ,6 = H 3 (M r λ,1 , C λ,1 , C λ,2 , C λ,3 , C λ,4 , C λ,5 ). If yes, it stores M r λ,1 λ . Otherwise, it outputs ⊥. * For ciphertext CT λ , a. If S λ belongs to the H 2 list in the form of (S λ , θ λ , µ λ ), then C computes M r λ ,1 λ = C λ ,3 /H 2 (S λ , θ λ ). Then, it checks whether 
Then, it sends the challenge ciphertexts CT * 1 and CT * 2 to the adversary. If ϑ = 0, then C chooses two unequal messages, M 1 and
Then, it sends the challenge ciphertexts CT * 1 and CT * 2 to the adversary.
Phase 2: A 2 performs more queries as in phase 1. However, the restriction is that CT * 1 and CT * 2 do not appear in the decryption and the test queries.
Guess: A 2 provides a guess ϑ * . If ϑ * = ϑ, then C outputs ϑ = 1, which means that CT * 1 and CT * 2 contain the same message, and declares that it was given a valid 7-tuple: (g a , g b , g c , g u , g v , e(g, g) abc , e(g, g) ubv ); C outputs ϑ = 0, which means that CT * 1 and CT * 2 contain different messages, and declares that it was given a random 7-tuple: (g a , g b , g c , g u , g v , e(g, g) d , e(g, g) w ).
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We theoretically analyze the asymptotic complexity of the proposed scheme and other PKEwET schemes in Table 1 . We describe the computational complexity in terms of the exponentiation operation E and the pairing operation P. We denote the number of attributes required in the ciphertext by |S C | and |S C |. In Table 1 , C Enc , C Dec and C Test represent the encryption algorithms, decryption algorithms and test algorithms, respectively. POA represents the proof of authorization. From the second to the fourth columns, we present the computational complexities of C Enc , C Dec and C Test . The fifth column indicates whether the underlying schemes are attribute based. The sixth column shows whether the schemes have the proof of authorization. The seventh column highlights the security levels of the schemes. The last column presents the underlying assumptions for guaranteeing the security.
From Table 1 , we observe that the computational complexity of our scheme depends on the number of attributes required by the ciphertext. Because our scheme incorporates the ABE scenario, it may not be as efficient as the prevalent works. The trade off is adjusted while offering the protection of user identities. Furthermore, in contrast to previous works, our scheme also allows the users to obtain fine-grained authorization of ciphertexts. To the best of our knowledge, Ma et al. first presented four types of authorizations in [29] . We find that our proposed scheme can perform the authorization and test in a more flexible manner because in our scheme, we can perform the authorization using the attributes of users. Furthermore, for the first time, the proof of authorization is proven based on the tDBDH assumption.
In general, our scheme is more practical in the cloud computing era. Users can store their ciphertexts on the could server by using KP-ABEwET. The cloud server can be authorized to perform some functionalities by transforming some trapdoors secretly. Therefore, the could server can perform the equality test independently. When users want to test the ciphertexts, they submit their attributes and the tested ciphertexts to the cloud sever. Accordingly, the cloud server responds with a reasonable answer or ⊥. Meanwhile, it also protects the identities of users.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new cryptosystem called key-policy attributebased encryption with equality test (KP-ABEwET) is presented. To the best of our knowledge, KP-ABEwET is the first attempt to combine the public key encryption supporting equality test with key-policy attribute-based encryption. The proposed scheme can be viewed as an extension of attributebased encryption with keyword search (ABEwKS) with the difference that it can test whether the ciphertexts contain the VOLUME 5, 2017 same information that were encrypted by different public keys. In contrast to previous schemes with equality test, the new scheme supports testing the ciphertexts with finegrained authorization and also hides the identity of the user. Moreover, the proposed scheme is one-way secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. Furthermore, a new computational problem called twin-decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (tDBDH) is proposed and is proven to be as hard as the DBDH problem. Finally, the security model of authorization is presented, and the security of authorization based on the tDBDH assumption is proven in the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to prove the security of authorization in such a scenario. 
